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I. IntroductIon
When pondering desirable reforms, I prefer to think about 
both the international financial system and the international 
monetary  system  because  as  this  global  crisis  demonstrates 
so vividly, the root causes can come from both the financial 
and the monetary spheres and they can interact in a variety of 
ways. On the financial side, I want to emphasize two problems: 
pricking asset price bubbles before they get too large, and 
confronting “too big to fail.” On the monetary side, I want to 
concentrate on what can be done to discourage “beggar-thy-
neighbor” exchange rate policies.
II. reformIng the InternatIonal 
fInancIal SyStem
Any credible story about the origins of this crisis has to give a 
role to easy credit conditions, a rapid run-up in housing and 
equity prices, and broad mispricing of risk. Recall, however, 
that  the  precrisis  orthodoxy,  at  least  in  central  banks,  was 
that it was unwise and unnecessary to ask central banks to 
attempt to prick asset price bubbles—on at least three counts. 
First, they have no reliable methodology for, or comparative 
advantage in, identifying such bubbles. Second, even if they 
could  identify  such  bubbles,  the  short-term  interest  rate 
was not a good instrument for pricking such bubbles: after 
all, small increases in rates would have little effect and large 
increases would generate too much collateral damage to the 
economy as a whole. Third, preemptive action was unnecessary 
because once such bubbles burst on their own, the mess could 
be cleaned up at relatively low cost by engineering a swift and 
sizeable decline in policy interest rates.
How has the crisis altered that orthodoxy? Clearly, the 
we-can-clean-it-up-cheaply-after-the-bubble-bursts-with-low-
interest-rates  argument  can  be  discarded  (at  least  for  cases 
where the buildup of the bubble involves significant lever-
age). Challenges to the we-can’t-identify-bubbles-beforehand 
argument have also been given some increased support from 
the crisis. Reflecting research done at both the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), twin threshold early-warning models of banking crises 
that identify tail observations on both excess credit growth 
and increases in housing and/or equity prices—as well as stud-
. See, for example, Greenspan 00.	
. See Gagnon 00 on why leverage matters for the cost of collapsing asset 
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ies that examine the relationship between indices of financial 
stress  and  economic  downturns—look  more  relevant  and 
promising than before the crisis (see Borio and Drehmann 
009 and Lall, Cardarelli, and Elekdag 008). If it remains 
difficult  to  identify  bubbles  before  they  get  too  large,  the 
message now to both central banks and regulatory authorities 
is: “I know, but try much harder.”
Last but not least, the crisis should prompt us to consider 
a better bubble-busting tool kit. As my Peterson colleague 
Adam Posen (009) put it in a recent paper, if one is faced with 
a leaky showerhead but has only a hammer, you are in a fix: 
small taps will do nothing, while a strong rap may break the 
pipe. What you need is duct tape for small leaks and a wrench 
for large ones. But what will serve as the duct tape and the 
wrench? I would say that the gathering consensus is that the 
duct tape and the wrench should be countercyclical changes 
in  some  combination  of  regulatory  capital  (risk  weighted 
and  unweighted)  and  regulatory  liquidity  requirements, 
margin requirements, loan-to-value ratios on residential and 
commercial  mortgages,  and  lending  standards.  In  a  recent 
report of the Pew Task Force on financial regulatory reform 
(Pew 009)—of which I am a member and signatory—the 
decision of when to activate such macroprudential instruments 
and which combination to use would be made (in the United 
States’ case) by a systemic risk oversight council composed 
of the central bank, the Treasury, and the leading regulatory 
authorities; it would then be implemented by the regulatory 
authorities. In some cases, the central bank would also “lean 
against the wind” by raising interest rates; in other cases, it 
might not. Yes, such macroprudential actions run the risk of 
killing off some expansions too soon, but they also hold the 
promise of avoiding severe collapses like the present one. I 
think it’s well worth a try.
A second major problem highlighted by the current crisis 
is how to prevent more financial institutions from becoming 
“too big to fail” (TBTF), how to shrink the existing TBTFs, 
and how to resolve in a more orderly way the systemically 
important institutions that are allowed to fail. Put in other 
words, how to have fewer Citigroups, and how to avoid both 
AIG and Lehman Brothers replays. Here too, I think we are 
going to need a more extensive tool kit.
Some  argue  that  the  way  to  discourage  TBTF  and 
to  internalize  the  externalities  associated  with  bigness 
and  complexity  is  to  impose  higher  capital  and  liquidity 
requirements  on  financial  institutions  deemed  systemically 
important  relative  to  those  not  so  designated.  Let  me  be 
clear. I am strongly in favor of such an ex ante differential 
capital and liquidity assessment. At the same time, at least 
two  observations  from  the  current  crisis  are  troubling. 
As  noted  by  Herring  (00),  the  five  largest  US  financial 
institutions  subject  to  Basel  capital  standards  that  either 
failed  or  were  forced  into  government-assisted  mergers  in 
008—namely  Bear  Stearns,  Washington  Mutual,  Lehman 
Brothers, Wachovia, and Merrill-Lynch—each had regulatory 
capital ratios ranging from .3 to 6. percent as of their 
last  quarterly  disclosure  before  they  were  shut  down;  that 
is, their capital not only exceeded the regulatory minimums 
but also was much above the standard for “well-capitalized” 
institutions. In addition, capital-based triggers in the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) prompt-corrective-
action regime for banks have hardly been operating according 
to plan. Instead of a graduated corrective response followed 
by the closing of the bank when it still has positive net worth, 
some banks are seemingly descending from well-capitalized 
to insolvent in one blow—with unhappy consequences for 
the deposit insurance fund. These observations hint strongly 
that the market does not place much confidence in reported 
regulatory capital ratios, and that capital-based triggers for 
prompt-corrective-action (at least as presently defined) are not 
sufficient to carry out their intended functions.
But if capital requirements alone are not up to the task 
of discouraging too-big-to fail, what other policy instruments 
can be utilized? I can think of at least four.
One is to require all systemically important institutions to 
have wind-down plans that will assure the primary supervisor 
(and the college of supervisors) that it can be resolved without 
creating unacceptable spillovers.3 In cases where the institution 
is too large and complex to be wound down in a nonsystemic 
way, the supervisor would have the authority to require the 
institution to shrink and to become less complex.
A  second  key  instrument  is  to  ensure  that  special 
resolution  authority  exists  for  all  systemically  important 
financial institutions—be they banks or nonbanks—so that 
there is a viable alternative to the over-the-weekend massive 
3. Herring (00) provides a useful outline how of such wind-down plans 
might operate.
I prefer a “belt and braces” approach to 
confronting too big to fail because none 
of the individual policy prescriptions 
by itself is likely to be effective 
enough (or perhaps saleable enough) 
on its own to solve the problem.N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 3   f e b r u a r y   2 0 1 0

government  bailout  of  the  failing  firm.  As  Rodgin  Cohen 
and I show in a recent paper (Cohen and Goldstein 009), 
corporate  bankruptcy  is  not  a  good  substitute  for  such 
resolution authority because bankruptcy pays little attention 
to  third-party  effects  that  are  the  essence  of  systemic  risk, 
because creditor stays—and their potential adverse systemic 
effects—are  part  and  parcel  of  the  bankruptcy  process, 
because bankruptcy proceedings move too slowly to protect 
the franchise value of the firm, and because bankruptcy does 
not permit pre-insolvency intervention.
Policy instrument number three is to design resolution 
authority in a way that supports market discipline. This means 
wiping out shareholders, changing management, and paying 
off creditors at estimated recovery cost (not at par); whenever 
possible,  it  also  means  not  selling  the  failing  firm  to  one 
of the larger players in the field (what I call “opportunistic 
deconsolidation”);  and  it  means  funding  the  resolution 
authority in part with ex ante and/or ex post fees on other 
financial  institutions  so  that  the  financial  sector—not  the 
taxpayer—pay’s the lion’s share of the costs.
The fourth policy instrument would be to impose explicit 
size  limits  on  systemically  important  financial  institutions 
relative to GDP, as recommended by my Peterson colleague 
Simon Johnson (009). When financial institutions become very 
large relative to a country’s GDP, they become very expensive 
to bail out—a lesson learned the hard way by Iceland, Ireland, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. There 
is no empirical evidence that there are economies of scale in 
banking  beyond  $00  billion  in  assets.  As  Johnson  (009) 
notes, six large, integrated financial groups had combined assets 
equal to less than 0 percent of US GDP in the mid-990s; 
today, their combined share of GDP is closer to 60 percent.
I prefer a “belt and braces” approach to confronting too 
big to fail because none of the individual policy prescriptions 
by itself is likely to be effective enough (or perhaps saleable 
enough)  on  its  own  to  solve  the  problem. When  you  put 
them  all  together,  however,  you  have  a  workable  plan  for 
confronting too big to fail.6 Yes, this comprehensive approach 
to confronting too big to fail is more interventionist than 
has been customary and it will mean that asset growth and 
probably profits in the larger firms will be lower than in the 
run-up to the crisis. But it will also mean that when there is a 
. Johnson (009) recommends that the size caps be  percent of GDP for 
commercial banks and  percent of GDP for investment banks.
. In this connection, I regard the “financial crisis responsibility fee”—just 
recently proposed by President Obama—as agood idea; see Goldstein 00.
6. Here, I very much agree with a recent statement of Kansas City Fed 
President, Thomas Hoenig, on confronting too big to fail: “Beginning to break 
them, to dismember them, is a fair thing to consider.” See summary in Di Leo 
00.
collapse in a systemically important institution, you and I will 
pay less to clean up the mess.
III. reformIng the exchange rate SyStem
Let me move next to the international monetary system. Here, 
I want to focus on one issue: what approaches are available 
to  induce  large,  surplus  economies  to  abandon  now—and 
to  avoid  in  the  future—beggar-thy-neighbor  exchange  rate 
policies. I would argue that this is a highly relevant issue on at 
least three counts.
First, one of the lessons that emerging economies will 
take away from this global financial and economic crisis is 
that the world is even a riskier place than they thought and 
that they need more “insurance” to cope with it—including 
much higher levels of international reserves. If there are no 
international rules or guidelines on how they acquire those 
additional reserves, some countries will be tempted to acquire 
them by maintaining highly undervalued real exchange rates. 
Occasional  special  drawing  rights  (SDR)  allocations,  easier 
IMF conditionality, and larger IMF quotas are not likely to 
be sufficient to dissuade them from building reserves in the 
wrong way. 
Second, if the budding global recovery is to be sustained, 
it will be necessary to engineer not only shifts in demand 
between the public and private sectors within countries, but 
also shifts in demand across countries. But if large economies 
now in surplus refuse to allow their real effective exchange 
rates to appreciate by any significant degree—or even worse, 
allow those rates to depreciate, external adjustment will be 
handicapped  and  prospects  for  a  sustainable  and  balanced 
expansion  will  diminish  (see,  for  example,  Blanchard  and 
Milesi-Ferretti 009). In this connection, it is worth noting 
that real effective exchange rate of the RMB has depreciated 
by roughly  percent over the past year and that my Peterson 
colleagues Bill Cline and John Williamson (00) reckon that 
the RMB remains undervalued by about 30 percent overall 
and by roughly 0 percent with respect to the dollar.8
Last but not least, the past half dozen years have witnessed 
. One place where I disagree with Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (009) is 
on their characterization of “good” versus “ bad” imbalances; given the large 
number of factors affecting saving and investment behavior, I do not believe 
this distinction will prove to be operational; in addition, their treatment 
underplays how the strength of global demand—particularly during a period 
of global recession—should affect assessments of exchange rate policy. 
8. Admittedly, the Cline and Williamson (00) estimates of RMB undervalu-
ation depend crucially on the estimated size of China’s global current-account 
surplus in 0; but even if that surplus turns out to be roughly half the size 
that Cline and Williamson estimate, the RMB would still be undervalued 
significantly (by  percent on a real effective basis).N u m b e r   Pb1 0 - 3   f e b r u a r y   2 0 1 0
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at  least  one  highly  significant  case  of  beggar-thy-neighbor 
exchange rate policy and a marked failure of Fund surveillance 
to  confront  it  effectively.  I  speak,  of  course,  of  Chinese 
exchange rate policy. Since I have written frequently and at 
length on this topic over the past half dozen years (see, for 
example, Goldstein 00, 006a, 006b, and 00, Goldstein 
and Lardy 003, 00, 006, 008, and 009, and Goldstein 
and Mussa 00), I can be relatively brief.
Between 003 and 00, China’s global current-account 
surplus rose without interruption—from roughly 3 percent 
of GDP to about  percent. At the same time, China was 
engaged in massive, prolonged, one-way intervention in the 
exchange market and large-scale sterilization of those reserve 
increases as well. From February 00 through the end of 00, 
the cumulative real effective appreciation of the RMB was 
zero (JP Morgan index). The Chinese economy was growing 
briskly throughout this period (0 percent or more in each 
year) and was frequently overheated, with growth peaking at 
 percent in the second quarter of 00. After that, there was 
some notable progress, but it proved to be short-lived. The real 
effective rate of the RMB appreciated by roughly  percent 
between November of 00 and March 009, and China’s 
global current-account surplus declined to 9 percent in 008 
and has been projected to fall further to  to 6 percent of GDP 
this year. But the RMB has given back about 60 percent of 
its cumulative real effective appreciation (since June 00) in 
the past  months and many believe that the fall in China’s 
current-account surplus will be partially or even fully reversed 
as the global economy recovers. Exchange market intervention 
was still about 0 percent of GDP in both 008 and in the 
first three quarters of this year. In a recent column, Martin 
Wolf (009) of the Financial Times addresses these concerns 
and emphasizes both that a policy of keeping the exchange 
rate  down  is  analytically  equivalent  to  trade  protectionism 
and that, judging by its reserve accumulation, China has “kept 
its exchange rate down to a degree unmatched in economic 
history.” Paul Krugman (00), writing in the New York Times, 
concludes that “with the economy still in a precarious state, 
beggar-thy-neighbor  policies  can’t  be  tolerated.  Something 
must be done about China’s currency.”
While all this was going on, the Fund’s surveillance of 
China’s exchange rate policy has been abysmal. The Fund was 
very slow to acknowledge that the RMB was undervalued, 
it was very late in recognizing the size of this misalignment, 
and its forecast of China’s global current-account imbalance 
has consistently been way off the mark—especially when that 
imbalance was increasing sharply. The Fund rejected the role 
of being a global umpire for the exchange rate system just 
when the international community needed that role the most. 
In my view, the Fund has been intimidated by the extreme 
sensitivity of the Chinese authorities to external criticism of 
their exchange rate policy, with the consequence that there 
has been no finding of manipulation despite strong evidence 
to  the  contrary,  there  have  been  no  ad  hoc  consultations 
to China, and the publication of the Article IV reports for 
00 and 008 have been delayed to an extraordinary degree. 
The argument that the Fund could not do more on bilateral 
surveillance  because  the 9  surveillance  guidelines  (IMF 
9)  were  outdated  seems  even  weaker  today  than  when 
it was advanced in 00 as a motivation for a new bilateral 
surveillance decision (see IMF 00a). Branding an exchange 
rate “fundamentally misaligned” has proved to be no easier 
to implement for the Fund than identifying “manipulation,” 
and in June 009 the IMF management had to reverse course 
and withdraw not only the proposal to make increased use 
of ad hoc consultations but also the de facto application of 
the  concept  of  fundamental  misalignment  itself  (see  IMF 
009).9 As my Peterson colleague Ted Truman concluded in 
a recent paper (Truman 009) the 00 surveillance decision 
“produced  no  tangible  results  affecting  members’  exchange 
rate policies.” How a June 009 staff guidance note (IMF 
009) could characterize the 00 decision as “a landmark for 
the Fund”—rather than a landmine—is beyond me. One of 
my other Peterson colleagues Mike Mussa (008) has analyzed 
in considerable detail the Fund’s exchange rate surveillance 
toward China’s exchange rate policies. His conclusion, offered 
in late 00 at a Peterson conference, was as follows: “In my 
view, the IMF’s approach to the application of surveillance 
to China’s exchange rate policy constitutes gross misfeasance, 
malfeasance, and nonfeasance by the managing director and 
the IMF more generally.” Speaking at the same conference 
and published in the same conference volume (Goldstein and 
9. Harking back to the introduction of this paper, the six-word version of this 
saga should be “surveillance decision for sale: never used.”
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Lardy 008), Lawrence Summers (008) offers the following 
assessment:  “It  is  possible  that  Michael  Mussa  may  have 
understated the case against the IMF in recent years. If one is 
to take seriously the notion that there is a global, multilateral 
agency tasked with the preservation of international financial 
stability … the job that the Fund has done over the past four 
years is indefensible and the culture of the Fund, with respect 
to these things, needs to be radically altered.” The 00 report 
by the Fund Independent Evaluation Office (IEO-IMF 00) 
on IMF exchange rate surveillance—going beyond the China 
case—was only slightly less scathing. The present managing 
director’s recent comments on the undervaluation of the RMB 
are welcome but they are very small potatoes in this long-
running saga. In short: Houston, we have a problem. 
Three dimensions of the problem seem to me to warrant 
particular attention.
First, we need to find a way to make the Fund’s engagement 
with members who have emerging exchange rate problems 
less subject to politicization and long delays. If it’s going to 
take a year or two to negotiate the acceptance of an ad hoc 
consultation, that’s not going to be a useful instrument.
Second, there needs to be a workable framework for the 
Fund’s exchange rate surveillance that is capable of sending 
the message that the Fund staff and management not only 
view the country’s exchange rate policy as ill-advised but also 
that this policy is inconsistent with the country’s obligations 
as a member of the Fund and hence, that the policy has to be 
changed. I think the failure to implement the 00 bilateral 
surveillance decision and the de facto “defanging” in June 009 
means there is now no such framework. All the Fund staff can 
convey now is an opinion on a country’s exchange rate policy 
that carries no more of an opprobrium than anybody else’s 
opinion. It’s as if the jury in a trial provided a summary of its 
deliberations but declined in the end—because the defendant 
might become too upset—to issue a verdict. Some say that the 
Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth—
agreed after the Pittsburgh G-0 summit in September 009 
(see  G-0  009)—will  provide  a  superior  framework  for 
addressing  global  imbalances  and  the  sustainability  of  the 
global expansion and that exchange problems can be better 
tackled within that broader context. I sincerely hope that they 
are right and that this peer-review process where the Fund acts 
an advisor to the G-0 will work much better than the ill-
fated 006 Multilateral Consultation on Global Imbalances 
(involving China, the euro area, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United States); see IMF 00b. Maybe this time it will be 
different because the memory of a deep global crisis will be fresh 
and because compromise will be easier to achieve within a G-0 
setting than in either narrower or broader country groupings. 
Maybe. Yet my instinct tells me that there are apt to be too 
many degrees of freedom in this kind of policy coordination 
exercise to resolve inconsistencies between policy plans and 
policy objectives and to resolve conflicts across countries on 
how  to  share  the  burden  of  adjustment.  Other  than  peer 
pressure, there is no disciplining mechanism for countries that 
don’t undertake their “fair” share of adjustment. And I would 
be very surprised if this kind of wide-ranging policy forum 
will provide a hospitable environment to negotiate changes in 
exchange rate policies.
Problem number three probably represents the biggest 
existing hole. Currently, there is no workable, graduated set 
of  penalties  for  countries  that  refuse  persistently  to  honor 
their  international  obligations  on  exchange  rate  policy—
particularly  if  they  are  large  economies  in  current-account 
surplus. There has to be some credible penalty in the middle 
between the Fund’s opinion on exchange rate policy (easily 
dismissed), and expulsion from the Fund for not honoring 
obligations under Article IV (too drastic to be useful). This 
problem has been recognized since the founding of the Fund 
but recent experience doesn’t suggest that we are any closer to 
a solution.
If those are the problems, what could be the flavor of the 
solutions? Let me indicate the direction of my thinking.
Fund management should press the membership to agree 
that any country that runs a global current-account imbalance 
equal to or greater than say,  percent of GDP (over a one-year 
period) will automatically be receiving an ad hoc consultation 
from the Fund to discuss its exchange rate policy. Perhaps the 
threshold for systemically important economies should be set 
lower than that for nonsystemic ones under the argument that 
adverse potential international spillovers are greater for the 
first group. I have been skeptical of these kinds of mechanical 
triggers in the past, but the seemingly endless negotiations 
and politicization on this issue in recent years has persuaded 
me  that  even  a  highly  imperfect  trigger  is  better  than  a 
discretionary process that yields no official action at all. Also, 
an objective indicator would make it harder for individual 
countries to claim that they were unfairly being singled out for 
special attention. At present, the current-account imbalances 
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of four of the G-0 economies (South Africa on the deficit 
side, and Argentina, China, and Saudi Arabia on the surplus 
side) would be large enough to trigger the proposed ad hoc 
consultation procedure.
Turning  to  the  framework  for  the  Fund’s  bilateral 
surveillance over exchange rate policies, I see no alternative to 
going back to rulings/verdicts by the Fund on whether or not 
a country is meeting its international obligations on exchange 
rate policy. Unlike the Fund staff and management, I don’t see 
such rulings/verdicts as “labels” that get in the way of a useful 
dialogue with members but rather as the very essence of what 
the Fund’s responsibilities are as the designated international 
umpire for exchange rate policy. In broad terms, the test should 
be whether the country’s real effective exchange rate is seriously 
misaligned, whether the country’s policies—intentionally or 
not—contribute materially to that misalignment, and whether 
the  misalignment  harms  significantly  the  country’s  trading 
partners. I don’t much care what name one puts on this ruling, 
but the ruling should carry the message that the country’s 
exchange rate policy has been found to be at variance with 
its Fund membership obligations, that this noncompliance 
must be eliminated in a timely way, and that, failing such a 
correction, the international community will have no choice 
but to impose penalties so as to protect the stability of the 
international monetary and trading system as a whole.
Finally,  on  the  structure  of  the  penalties  or  “teeth,”  I 
think they need to be graduated according to the extent and 
duration of the misalignment; they should also encompass a 
range of actions by the Fund and its members.
Consider, for example, the following three broad ranges 
of real exchange rate misalignment: category A would cover 
misalignments up to 0 percent and up to a year’s duration; 
category B would address misalignments of 0 to  percent 
and – months’ duration; and category C would pertain 
to misalignments greater than  percent and lasting longer 
than two years. Category A misalignments would generate 
intensive but private consultations with the Fund.
Once  an  exchange  rate  misalignment  entered  category 
B, the Fund would go public in naming the country as not 
meeting its obligations on exchange rate policy as a member of 
the Fund and it would ask the member to offer a specific plan 
for reducing the misalignment. Category B countries would 
also not be able to delay the publication of Fund reports on 
their exchange rate policy. Finally, if a currency entered category 
C, a more severe set of penalties would be on the table. If the 
country were not willing to commit to a credible plan of action 
that would reduce significantly the size of the misalignment 
within a year’s time, the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
would approve trade policy retaliation based on an exchange 
rate policy finding from the Fund. My Peterson colleagues C. 
Fred Bergsten (009) and Arvind Subramanian with Mattoo 
(009) have made some useful specific suggestions on how such 
IMF and WTO collaboration might take place.0 Category C 
countries would also forfeit (temporarily) their eligibility for 
SDR allocations and for increases in their quota in the Fund.
Many will no doubt say that such a plan for reform of 
the  Fund  surveillance  over  exchange  rate  policies  is  both 
impractical and undesirable: impractical because less ambitious 
plans for a strengthening of Fund surveillance could not garner 
the  requisite  support  of  the  membership,  and  undesirable 
because a purpose of the Fund is to open markets—not to 
authorize policies that would close markets. To them, I offer 
two replies.
This historic crisis presents an opportunity—for the first 
time in many years—for wholesale reform of the international 
financial  architecture.  IMF  management  has  been  bold  in 
seeking real change in some dimensions of IMF operations but 
they have been a mouse on reform of exchange rate surveillance 
at the very time that the temptations for countries to follow 
beggar-thy-neighbor  policies  are  growing.  Yes,  they  have 
obtained agreement on the current set of watered-down bilateral 
surveillance  guidelines  and  they  have  avoided  antagonizing 
further  some  large  members  by  dropping  any  “labels”  on 
exchange rate policy from their reports. But what has been 
agreed has all the utility of a nonabsorbent dish towel. It offers 
no guide to what is and what is not internationally acceptable 
exchange rate policy; it finds no country guilty of misbehaving 
when the evidence to the contrary is by now overwhelming; 
it  offers  no  incentives/penalties  designed  to  change  errant 
behavior; and it removes the one institution (the Fund) that 
could plausibly serve as a credible international umpire from a 
0. See also Hufbauer and Brunel 008 for a more skeptical view of bringing 
the WTO into currency disputes.
Fund management should press the 
membership to agree that any country 
that runs a global current-account 
imbalance equal to or greater than 
say, 4 percent of GDP (over a one-year 
period) will automatically be receiving 
an ad hoc consultation from the Fund 
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policy arena that is rife with opportunities for breaking the rules 
and gaining market share at your neighbor’s expense.
On encouraging versus discouraging open markets, it is 
time to recognize three realities. First, a policy of persistent, 
large-scale, one-way intervention in exchange markets—paired 
with  large-scale  sterilization  of  reserve  increases—aimed 
principally  at  preventing  the  real  exchange  rate  from 
appreciating is protectionism. Second, relying exclusively on 
open-mouth operations and peer pressure to dissuade countries 
from  continuing  beggar-thy-neighbor  exchange  rate  policies 
has shown itself to be ineffective. And third, when countries 
are faced with both persistent exchange rate protectionism on 
the part of their trading partners and an unwillingness and/or 
inability of the relevant international authority to take strong 
action to correct such behavior, the likely response will be the 
adoption of “vigilante” protectionist trade policies at the national 
level—particularly  during  a  period  of  high  unemployment 
rates. Far better in that situation to have any such trade policy 
retaliation or compensation authorized by the IMF and WTO 
at the international level where its duration, scope, magnitude, 
and rationale can be appropriately controlled—much in the 
same  way  that  WTO  members  are  presently  permitted  to 
undertake compensating trade policy actions for trade policy 
abuses abroad under the current WTO regime.
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